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Why did the Soviet Union and its East European allies establish
patent offices? Patents, after all, create private property rights which
may interfere with the goals of state ownership and central planning.
The Soviet Union and its allies also established secret patents, but
wouldn’t secret patents undermine the free flow of information, one
of the purported advantages of state planning and the inventor’s cer-
tificate, a socialist form of patent? Although most developed market
economies had secret patents or rules on maintaining secrecy for patent
applications judged important to national security, why did the Soviet
Union and its allies believe they needed to do so too? Were the com-
munist countries more or less secretive than the market economies?
This article explores the above questions by examining the Soviet
and GDR secret patent systems, comparing them to each other and to
the systems in selected developed market economies (the FRG, United
States, United Kingdom and France). This analysis provides the first
quantitative cross-national assessment of state secrecy, showing that
considerable national differences have existed in how secrecy was used
even in the former Communist countries.
Centrally-planned economies struggled to keep up technologically
with developed market economies and encountered enormous difficul-
ties in establishing incentives that would push their enterprises to cre-
ate new products and technologies or to raise the quality of their ex-
isting products. Once a product was produced in a centrally planned
economy, making more of it seemed relatively straightforward for state
enterprises; creating an entirely new product proved more difficult.
The Soviet and GDR patent systems, after being modified to con-
form to state ownership, served as key managerial tools for central
planners in their struggle to force new technology usage. Patents per-
mitted quantification of innovation, the establishment of planners’ ob-
jective goals in an area that generally lacked them. Patents also had an
international aspect, permitting planners to compare new technologies
in other countries with their own.
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By following the development of the USSR and GDR patent sys-
tems, we examine their efforts at industrial innovation and tap into a
major source of micro level data. Both the Soviet Union and the GDR
filed thousands of domestic patents yearly; the Soviet Union, tens of
thousands.1 Analyzing how their patent systems developed reveals the
problems central planners faced as they sought a rate of technological
progress comparable to that of market economies. Laser technology
provides a brief case study on secrecy and technology development
in the USSR and GDR. Patent data show that the USSR and GDR
economies lagged behind the United States in filing patent applications
for lasers, even though USSR scientists were among the pioneers in the
field of quantum electronics and the GDR excelled in the optical sci-
ences. Central planning required the top-down management of laser
technology and left little room for small, independent developers.
Military competition with the West increased the urgency of man-
aging technological progress in the Warsaw Pact countries, for new
weapons systems depended on new or improved technologies. This
urgency was especially acute in the Soviet Union, which shouldered
the major burden of military competition with the Warsaw Pact’s ad-
versaries. Secret patenting expanded in the Soviet Union; it appears
to have been less significant in the GDR, where military production
was at first discouraged, then subsequently occupied only a relatively
modest share of the national economy.
Following the collapse of the GDR regime, the Deutsches Patent
und Markenamt (DPMA) obtained data on 930 secret GDR patents.
This information is analyzed for its comprehensiveness and, together
with other GDR patent information, provides a basis for estimating the
share of total patents accounted for by secret patents. This estimation
for the GDR is compared to Soviet data and data on secret patents
from selected market economies.
1 The USSR.
1.1 Inventor’s Certificates: Adapting Patents
to Central Planning
During the second half of the 19th century the Russian economy began a pe-
riod of rapid industrialization, tapping into foreign investment. The growing
influence of patent laws in supporting industrial progress elsewhere and their
presumed importance to foreign investors caught the attention of Tsarist of-
ficials. In 1896 Russia promulgated a Decree of Privileges for Inventions and
1For simplicity’s sake we consider a Soviet inventor’s certificate and a GDR Wirtschaft-
patent a form of patent.
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Improvements that brought its system much closer to practices found in the
rest of Europe.
When the Bolsheviks consolidated power, encouraging inventors seemed
an unlikely economic policy priority; yet Marxists viewed new technologies
as drivers of economic and social change. Lenin’s decree to replace Tsarist
patents in 1919 with Bolshevik ones was based on ideological conviction
and occurred at the same time as the Bolsheviks nationalized industry and
banking, banned private enterprise and rationed food. Under Lenin’s de-
cree inventions could be declared the property of the Russian government
and subject to use by all citizens through compulsory negotiations. While
other countries’ patent laws permitted compulsory licensing, usually with
an overriding social good such as broader access to miracle drugs, invoking
such compulsion was considered extreme and rarely done; in early post-
revolutionary Russia, it was to be the general rule for all technologies.
Russian economic hardship softened post-revolutionary rigidity. Living
conditions had declined under the new Bolshevik-led government making
its hold on power tenuous, and the leaders responded by tempering their
radical economic policies with what became known as the New Economic
Policy (NEP). Replacing Lenin’s decree with a more traditional patent law
to encourage local inventors and attract foreign investment was one of the
many NEP economic policy changes. The re-institution of patents evidently
encouraged local scientists and engineers, and patent applications from So-
viet citizens rose from about 4,300 in 1924 to about 24,000 in 1929 (Martens
table A5.5, p. 256). 2 One prominent inventor and pioneer in semiconduc-
tor research, Oleg Losev, responded to the new incentives and received ten
patents during this brief market-oriented period.
The NEP and its attempts to attract foreign investment clashed with
Bolshevik ideological fervor and Stalin’s maneuverings to consolidate his po-
litical power. The inauguration of the five-year plan in 1928 spelled the end of
the NEP and with that, the return to a more ideologically acceptable patent
policy. How the change happened was also instructive as it foreshadowed
more violent political methods. Spies were discovered in the patent office,3
tried, and executed. The head of the patent office, an early Bolshevik and
friend of Lenin’s, Ludvig K. Martens, was removed from his position. In
1931 a new law on inventions was promulgated and with it a parallel system
of protection: patents for foreigners and inventor’s certificates (avtorskoye
svidetel’stvo) for Soviet citizens.4
2From 1919-1923 only about 4,000 applications were recorded.
3Known as the Committee for Invention (Komitet po Delam Izobretenii).
4The 1931 law permitted foreigners and Soviet citizens to choose either form of pro-
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Soviet legal specialists proclaimed the superiority of the inventor’s cer-
tificate over the bourgeois patent in promoting the use of new technologies.
According to Soviet theorists, capitalist patent systems were flawed for they:
• Suppressed the talents of the masses. Workers were reluctant to invent,
for they understood that any inventions they made would be used
against them and only enrich their overlords.
• Slowed innovation, often blocking the use of the most advanced tech-
nologies. Finance capitalists didn’t compete, but rigged the markets
in global cartels that suppressed new inventions.
• Fostered a cult of industrial secrecy that choked off the flow of impor-
tant technical information. Patent owners paid lip service to disclosure,
but worked hard to prevent the release of any useful information on
their inventions.
1.2 Inventions and the Soviet Five-Year Plans
Soviet economic theory was soon put into practice when the Communist
Party announced a centrally planned economy based on five-year plans.
Planning imposed quantitative goals - tons of steel, number of tractors,
square meters of cloth, etc. - on industrial managers and provided few incen-
tives for using or creating new manufacturing technologies or new products.
Left on their own, factory managers fulfilled plan targets and ignored in-
novation, especially if it might interfere with immediate plan fulfillment.
Managers’ efforts focused on getting the plan goals they wanted, not on
discovering risky new products or processes.
The inventor’s certificate provided Soviet planners with an answer to
their quandary about how to force factory managers to pay attention to
new technologies. The 1931 invention law had left the Soviet patent office,
the Committee for Inventions, intact and required it to conduct technical
examinations for novelty on all applications for inventor’s certificates. The
resulting logic for state policy was straightforward: if an inventor’s certificate
was granted, then it was new to the world and should be used by industry.
Consequently, the Committee for Inventing established a special department
tection, but the law’s intent is clearly shown in the annual statistics. In the twenty years
after the 1931 law Soviet citizens were granted 66,771 inventor’s certificates; foreigners,
95. See Martens, table A5.7. In the same period Soviet citizens were granted 423 patents;
foreigners, 1,782. Soviet citizens subsequently received only 22 patents from 1941 to 1987.
See Martens table A5.8.
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for choosing new inventions to be sent to factory directors and recommended
for use. Inventor’s certificates belonged to the state and that eliminated
any worry about ownership. The Committee still issued patents, but they
were carefully neutered during examination and went largely to foreigners.5
Planners created relevant metrics on which to judge factory innovation per-
formance and counterbalance the preoccupation with production goals: the
number of inventor’s certificate applications, number of applications that
passed the technical examination and number of inventions used in produc-
tion. If factory directors failed to use new inventions, they faced pressure
from state planners to explain themselves.
Only a half dozen years passed before Soviet economic officials back-
tracked on pressuring factory managers to use inventions. The Great Terror,
a period of political violence from 1936 to 1938, resulted in the execution
of top officials at the Committee for Inventions. In 1936, the Committee
was abolished and its main resources were transferred to the military. Most
alarmingly, "false inventors" (l’zhi izobretateli) were discovered. One false
inventor, Aleksandr Moisyevich Zarkhin, wrote Stalin from the GULag plead-
ing the case for his misunderstood technology. (RGAE 4461/8/44/1-5 cited
in Martens 67-68) False inventors had tricked the Communist Party into
funding inventions that didn’t work and cost the state valuable resources
and time. The Committee had supported such false inventors, much to the
consternation of factory managers who often saw innovation as an activity
that got in the way of plan fulfillment. The pressure on factory managers
to use inventions eased, and they were allowed to satisfy central planners
by using worker suggestions (ratsionalizatorkoye predlozheniye), a much less
rigorous type of innovation.
Worker suggestions, while sometimes quite useful, were usually not linked
to the world’s latest technological advancements. The earlier Soviet slogan
of “catching up and overtaking” (dognat’ i peregnat’ ) the technologically ad-
vanced capitalist countries might never happen if factory managers could
get by with only using worker suggestions and ducking more advanced in-
ventions.
World War II showed the Soviet leadership just how important advanced
technologies were for military might. In 1956 Soviet officials once again em-
5The Committee for Inventions forwarded foreigners’ patent applications to factory
directors via the NKVD’s classified channels and asked them for help in drafting claims
to make sure that granted patents wouldn’t negatively affect Soviet industry (RGAE
4461/8/46/271). Patents offer protection only in the country or countries where they are
granted. If foreigners did not patent their new inventions in the Soviet Union, then Soviet
factories were free to use them.
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braced inventions as a solution for their innovation problem. A wealthier
Soviet state was able to invest significant resources into rebuilding a Com-
mittee for Inventing, soon to be called the State Committee for Inventions
and Discoveries, and relaunch its experiment in promoting inventor’s certifi-
cates on a much grander scale.
Statistically the new invention campaign was a success. Plan indicators,
such as the number of new inventor’s certificates granted and used, continued
to grow robustly during the 1970s and early 1980s, but they appeared to be
hollow propaganda victories and had little direct impact on the economy.
In 1964 the Committee for Inventions recorded 72,135 inventor’s certificate
applications from Soviet inventors; in 1984, 145,910. The U.S. patent office in
1964 reported 72,317 patent applications by U.S. residents; in 1984, 61,841.
Was the Soviet Union’s economy dominating international technology
markets with its renewed emphasis on inventions? International compar-
isons by Western economists showed the Soviet Union falling behind the ad-
vanced capitalist economies technologically, not overtaking them (Martens
and Young; and Amann, Cooper and Davies). Foreign patenting by Soviet
institutions, perhaps a relatively accurate measure of technological compet-
itiveness, slumped and remained an extremely small share of total annual
inventor’s certificate grants.6 Soviet officials had also hoped to expand tech-
nology licensing as a way to benefit from their investments in science and
engineering; yet Soviet enterprises concluded relatively few licenses with for-
eign firms. During the sixty years that the inventor’s certificate existed,
Soviet newspaper articles often bemoaned the failure of Soviet factories to
innovate, and Western studies tracked lagging Soviet performance in devel-
oping and using new technologies. Stagnation (zastoy) became the term
often applied by economists to this period in the history of Soviet socialism.
On 31 May 1991 the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet replaced the law on in-
ventions with a patent law and in so doing enacted a controversial economic
reform. Inventor’s certificates, created in 1931 as an ideological alternative
to capitalist patents, were abolished. Violence had accompanied the 1931
changeover, with accusations of espionage and the arrest and execution of
patent office officials. Now, sixty years later, the change was peaceful. It
was a stark admission by the Soviet leadership that their 60-year central-
planning experiment had failed. The Soviet economy had proven incapable
of competing with market economies in creating and using new technologies.
6By the end of the 1980s Soviet inventors filed in the United States slightly fewer
patents (about 400) than they had in the early 1970s. See Martens, 134-135. In 1970
Soviet inventors filed about 115,000 inventor’s certificate applications; in 1985, 168,000.
See Martens, table A5.1.
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2 The German Democratic Republic
2.1 Following in the Soviet Union’s Footsteps, the German
Democratic Republic creates the Wirtschaftspatent
After World War II each of the four victorious major allied powers (France,
United Kingdom, United States and Soviet Union) administered a distinct
geographic area of the new post-war boundaries of the former German Reich.
The Cold War engendered numerous differences among the occupiers on how
to govern post-war Germany, with most of the disputes occurring between
the Soviet Union and the other three powers. In 1949 the three western
zones were combined into one Federal Republic (FRG) and the Soviet zone
assumed the title of German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 1955 the FRG
and GDR each acquired de facto sovereignty over their territories.
Early Soviet governing of its occupation zone focused on extracting war
reparations. At first, entire German factories were crated and shipped back
to the Soviet Union. Later the reparations focused on tapping into German
technological prowess, for German technology had impressed Soviet military
officials during the war. On Sept. 1947 Marshal Vasiliy D. Sokolovskiy, the
commander in chief of Soviet occupation forces, sent a secret memo on this
subject to Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov:
“It is known that the British and Americans have taken from
the Germans valuable patents, designs, formulas, etc. Thanks
to careful preparations made by them even before the invasion
of Europe, they prepared and sent into Europe for this purpose
several thousand highly qualified specialists, and they are now
conducting a major, well-funded effort to identify and acquire
German inventors for work in the interests of America and Eng-
land . . . The Americans intend to decide separately the issue
of the German Patent Office . . . We are seriously behind on
this issue and we should take measures to activate work in the
very same direction, both in bringing inventors to work in the
U.S.S.R. and speeding up the use in the U.S.S.R. of valuable
German inventions.”(RGAE 4372, op. 94, delo 438 t.1 (194) p.
396).
One year later Sokolovskiy ordered the establishment of an Office for
Invention (Büro für Erfindungswesen), which would function to meet the
challenge made by any patent office established by the Western powers.7
7Befehl des Obersten Chefs der SMAD des Oberkommandierenden der Gruppe der
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Living in the shadow of their Soviet mentors to the east and an increas-
ingly prosperous FRG economy to the west, GDR leaders carefully articu-
lated their economic development policies. Many GDR leaders were trained
in the USSR and their economic policy choices largely reflected Soviet views
on the supremacy of the communist party and its use of central planning.
Yet, after Stalin’s death Soviet economic policies were in flux, making the
outlines of orthodoxy less clear. An immediate implementation of Soviet
economic policy in the GDR required practical choices quite different from
what Soviet officials had faced. The GDR’s domestic political situation re-
mained unsettled after the workers’ riots in 1953, and economic policies had
to take into account potential unrest. The open border with West Berlin
allowed GDR citizens to express their economic dissatisfaction by leaving
the country.
Developing and using new technologies was a difficult problem for So-
viet planners and it soon surfaced as a major problem area for the GDR’s
planners as well.8 Changes in the GDR’s economic policies that promoted
technological innovation closely paralleled the policy changes occurring in the
Soviet Union. The GDR’s second five year plan (1956-60) “. . . envisaged a
stronger increase of productivity and profitability through the introduction
of new technology. The prioritization of science and technology was the es-
sential difference between the second and the first Five-Year Plans.” (Steiner
71). This sudden emphasis on technological innovation in the GDR echoed
Moscow’s call for a shift from extensive development to intensive develop-
ment, a shift from quantitative successes (e.g., more steel) to qualitative ones
(e.g., new or better steel).
To bolster intensive development, the Communist Party in Moscow cre-
ated a State Committee for New Technology (May 28, 1955) and several
years later it announced a new law on inventions and discoveries.9 GDR
officials followed Soviet organizational changes with the creation of a Re-
search Council (Forschungsrat), which had many of the same duties as the
USSR State Committee for New Technology. In the early 1960s the GDR
switched from the German system of technical standards (DIN) to the So-
viet system (GOST)(Steiner 107). Standards provided Soviet central plan-
ners incentives to motivate innovation-shy managers, especially in the "mark
Sowjetischen Besatzungstruppen in Deutschland Nr 107, 11.6.1948. Cited in Wießner, p.
238.
8This issue is carefully woven through a major economic history of the GDR. See
Steiner pp. 84-85, 112 and 134
9Ron Amann pinpoints this USSR shift in economic policy to a July 17, 1955 speech
by Nikolay A. Bulganin. Amann and Cooper, p.146.
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of quality" or "quality attestation" system. (Hill 53-54) Furthermore, So-
viet standards bound GDR industry closer to their Council for Mutual Eco-
nomic Assistance (CMEA) partners. In the mid to late 1960s, combines,
such as the Volkseigene Betriebe or VEB and large-scale scientific research
centers, were established in the GDR, following on the heels of the Soviet
formation of Scientific-Production Associations (nauchno-proizvodstvennye
ob”yedineniya) which aimed to bring science closer to production.
As described above, the invention system became a central pillar of the
Soviet Union’s efforts at creating and using new technologies. Modeled on
capitalist patent systems, it was expected to motivate scientists and engineers
to contribute to economic development. They believed that a patent law’s
novelty requirement, that new applications not replicate what existed in
the international patent literature, assured that new inventions were cutting
edge, world class. Planners needed only to motivate enterprise directors to
use these new inventions.
Many GDR scientists and engineers were familiar with intellectual prop-
erty institutions, for Germany had had an established national patent office
and patent law since 1877. The Soviet patent system might also have seemed
familiar to GDR specialists, for it drew heavily on earlier German law.10
When crafting their new post-war system, the GDR Patent Office (Das Amt
für Erfindungs- und Patentwesen der DDR – AfEP) grafted their prior Ger-
man experience to the model established by the Soviet State Committee for
Inventions and Discoveries.
The immediate post-war Soviet invention system was in flux and pro-
vided rather shaky guideposts for the GDR’s legislators. When the GDR
was formed, worker suggestion plans remained in ascendancy in the Soviet
Union, but this focus was changing. Early post-war GDR officials had also
favored worker suggestions over inventions (Breith 26 and Koblank). Worker
suggestions had no novelty examination, nor were the dates of their creation
relevant. Factory managers preferred them, for they made plan fulfillment
much easier. Central planners, however, doubted the effectiveness of worker
suggestion plans in spurring the creation and use of path-breaking technolo-
gies. In the end, central planners won and economic policies in the So-
viet Union and GDR favored emphasizing inventions over worker suggestion
plans.
The new GDR patent law and patent office also reflected Soviet experi-
10Ludvig Karlovich Martens, a German immigrant and fervent Bolshevik, oversaw the
drafting of the Soviet Patent Law of 1924 and headed the first Soviet patent office. Martens
is buried in Moscow’s Novodevichiy cemetery.
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ence. The patent law introduced an economic patent or Wirtschaftspatent,
which had the essential characteristics of the Soviet inventor’s certificate.11
The GDR Ministry of Planning directly oversaw the patent office, a bureau-
cratic chain of command that mirrored the Soviet practice at the time.
GDR economic officials studied Soviet practices carefully and hoped that
invention management would overcome the planned economy’s difficulties in
nurturing new technologies. The GDR statistical administration published
in the state’s annual economic statistics the growth in the number of inven-
tion applications as a principal indicator of increasing technological progress
in the economy. Simply put, more inventions or suggestions meant more
progress (Statistisches Jahrbuch). 12 This statistical good news reportage
mirrored closely how the Soviet Goskomstat tracked the growth of inventor’s
certificates.
The GDR statistical administration also provided annual confidential
reports on inventing for Party leaders. These insider reports reflected changes
in the Party’s views on which problem areas needed most attention. They
contained micro level data from the VEBs and put direct peer pressure on
enterprise managers (Ergebnisse). Each year VEBs showed plan fulfillment
in applying for a specific number of inventions; it was a category that could
be manipulated relatively easily. Tracking quicker and more extensive use
of new technologies proved more difficult and became an important focus of
the confidential statistical report, sometimes revealing the game of cat and
mouse played by central planners and enterprise directors. Each year the
report recorded a VEB’s planned number of inventions to be used (Eingeführt
in die Praxis) and its success rate. Of course, such reporting couldn’t begin
to capture how significant each invention was. Consequently, from 1980-
85 the report added a demand that the inventions’ usefulness (measured
monetarily) during the year be reported and that subsequent usage by other
enterprises (Nachnutzung) also be reported. It’s difficult to imagine that the
required calculations for these reports provided useful information; after all,
prices largely signaled planners’ priorities, not market conditions.13 In 1986
11The traditional patent was named an Ausschließungspatent or exclusive patent, em-
phasizing the right to exclude others from use of the invention. As with the inventor’s
certificate, inventors who used state property in developing their inventions were obligated
to apply for a Wirtschaftspatent. It could be used freely by any state-owned enterprise.
12Invention data were similarly reported in the official Soviet statistical handbook Naro-
dnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR. One GDR writer referred to this way of thinking as “Tonnenide-
ologie” or ideology by the ton. Gregor, p.8.
13The U.S.S.R. State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries’ journal, Voprosy izo-
bretatel’stva, contained numerous articles outlining how to calculate an invention’s use-
fulness, spelling out complicated mathematical formulae. Some inventions resulted not in
10
officials dropped these categories in favor of a new concept, social usefulness
(Gesellschaftlicher Nutzen). Central planners were spinning their wheels
while staying in place.























Source: GDR: Various copies of Ergebnisse der Erfindertätigkeit und
Schutzrechtsarbeit, Ministerrat der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik Staatliche
Zentralverwaltung für Statistik. Vertrauliche Verschlußsache – gelöscht.
Bundesarchiv DE2 30031 and DE2 300343. USSR: Martens table A5.5.
The problems in creating and using new technologies became increas-
ingly obvious to the GDR’s economic officials, but much like their Soviet
counterparts, they seemed perplexed at what to do. The Berlin Wall had
ended the hemorrhage of highly-qualified specialists, but the technological
level of GDR industry, like that of its Soviet counterpart, continued to fall
slowly behind that of the Western economies. Party dogma had insisted that
all of the advantages for capturing the benefits of technological progress be-
longed to central planning; yet, their data showed that enterprises remained
economic savings, but in quality improvements. There were special calculations for these
inventions, too. The whole exercise reflected the difficulties, some might say futility, in
judging new technologies with no market signals for guidance.
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unmotivated to use new technologies. Only two percent of the economy’s
recorded economic benefits from new technology came from secondary use
(Nachnutzung) (Wiedemann and Zobel 164). GDR legislators sought to fine
tune the state’s innovation system by making changes to its patent law in
1963.(Gesetz. GBl. I Nr. 9 p. 121). The revised law tackled the issue of
speeding up the flow of patent information on domestic inventions to state
enterprises by creating a new, more limited, examination procedure whereby
applications were approved after a short review, one that did not include ex-
amining novelty, technological level, prior art or inventive step. These latter
standard requirements for issuing patents came into play when a patent was
challenged by a second party or used by an enterprise.
Party theorists had assumed that once capitalist ownership restrictions
disappeared, state enterprises would automatically embrace new technolo-
gies. As a result they placed confidence in AfEP, which oversaw a system for
distributing information on new inventions.14 AfEP’s Economic Department
functioned much like the Soviet Committee for Inventing in the 1930s and
the State Committee after the mid-1950s, reviewing all new patent appli-
cations and signaling to enterprises what they considered to be unusually
useful inventions. It assumed that innovation needed direction from above
and left little room for local initiative.
The lack of results undoubtedly disappointed Party leaders who believed
that the Wirtschaftspatent had a key role to play in their innovation strat-
egy. State enterprises functioned under central plan guidelines, but potential
users of new technologies would avoid using a Wirtschaftspatent if it risked
undermining the plan indicators or required significant funds. At best, state
enterprises might agree to include the use of new technologies in later plans,
a slow and cumbersome process ill-suited to the increasing tempo of the
technological revolution. The developers of new technologies also saw little
advantage to being involved in the process, for Party dogma left little room
for being adequately compensated for their efforts.
In 1966 several GDR legal specialists proposed a major change - a sys-
tem of socialist licenses for compensating the organizations that developed
new technologies, giving them incentives to spread their new technologies to
other state users.(Wießner 258-260; Adrian and Schönfeld 58-60; and Kastler
514-524). The proposed change maintained state ownership, but tried to in-
ject financial incentives akin to the royalties earned by licensors in market
14The Soviet Union at first published when and where inventions were used for the first
time in the economy in its annual patent journal (Byulleten’ izobretenii); later it issued a
separate, dedicated journal, Vnedryennye izobreteniya, with the information. The GDR
published summary descriptions of new inventions in the journal Der Neuerer.
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economies. Technology developers, when adequately compensated, would be-
come stakeholders in the new technology’s success at the using enterprises,
thereby reducing risks for the new users, and the developers would actively
champion their new technologies rather than remaining passive bystanders.
Perhaps the GDR’s greater proximity to Western thinking led it to propose
such a solution; shortly after the discussion was launched in the GDR, a
similar proposal surfaced in the U.S.S.R.(Mitrakov 9-11 and Dumesh 5). Ul-
timately a socialist license required granting a quasi-monopoly right to the
developer, for the scheme depended on giving developers bargaining power.
It also by-passed the central planners’ role in dictating statewide priorities,
for technology developers could amass resources for developing what plan-
ners considered non-priority areas. Challenging the power of state planners
was tantamount to challenging the power of the Party. As a result, the
discussion went nowhere in either the GDR or the U.S.S.R.
Soviet and GDR inventions weren’t only to be shared free of charge with
their own country’s enterprises, but with other CMEA country enterprises
as well. Efforts to promote the sharing of new inventions among the CMEA
countries sputtered just as had domestic sharing. Little came of them.
Patents represent new ideas, but much development work remains before
they can be commercialized. Moreover, not all new ideas have commercial
value. Not surprisingly, GDR enterprises showed no interest in about 96
percent of the “most significant” inventions touted by other CMEA patent
offices (see figure 2).
Once the push for socialist licenses had failed, the political leadership
satisfied itself with tinkering at the edges of their technology problem. A
new patent law in 1983 kept the lawyers in the academic think tanks busy,
but changed very little substantively. GDR statistics continued to show that
everything was fine, for the number of patent applications and the number
of inventions used in the economy continued to grow.
The GDR economy’s relatively slow use of new technology and general
failure to innovate did not mean, of course, that all GDR entrepreneurs were
thwarted. Some GDR individuals and organizations did overcome the diffi-
culties of a centrally-planned economy. Dieter Moseman, an engineer at the
VEB Kühltechnik, successfully patented state-of-the-art rotary screw com-
pressors while in the GDR and continued to commercialize his inventions
once living in the FRG (Patente). VEB Carl Zeiss Jena developed an origi-
nal fiber-optic projection system for use in planetariums and found a ready
market for it world wide. Soviet commercial successes with new technolo-
gies are less evident. Although Soviet scientists and engineers pioneered in
the development of many important technologies, they rarely succeeded in
13
Figure 2: Significant Inventions from CMEA Member States for which GDR


































































































Source: Bundesarchiv 05.11.1981 DF3 9387
commercializingd them (Graham).
3 Secret Patents
Most developed market economies, recognizing the growing importance of
military technologies and hoping to prevent their spread to potential adver-
saries, modified their patent systems to establish secret patents even though
this change contradicted the principle of disclosure. 15 World War I pro-
pelled the extension of secrecy to patenting in France, Germany, the United
Kingdom and the United States. Each of these countries has a different
legal tradition and historical experience that are reflected in their differing
approaches to patent secrecy. While some secrecy measures were disbanded
at the end of World War I, they resumed to become even more rigorous
following World War II and the advent of atomic weapons. One recent ex-
15A patent application must disclose the invention in sufficient detail for a person skilled
in the art to carry out the.
14
amination of patent secrecy lists twenty-one countries with patent secrecy as
part of their national legislation. (Wuylens 132).
Most intellectual property lawyers rarely encounter patent secrecy reg-
ulations in their practices, patent law textbooks usually mention it only
briefly and the economic analyses of patent regimes generally ignore the
subject. The very nature of the subject constrains the availability of public
information, for governments are reluctant to discuss their secrecy policies
openly. The United Kingdom has published a redacted list of technology ar-
eas that guides its patent office in identifying applications that may require
secrecy. The list comprises many technologies that have significant mili-
tary uses, which explains why governments sometimes consider it prudent to
temporarily block publication of related patents.16
In Germany Büro 99 of its Patent and Trademark Office (DPMA -
Deutsches Patent- und Markenamt) examines and stores the secret patents,
which comprise a relatively small share of domestic applications. From 1965
to 1984 the DPMA granted about 1.2 million patents to German residents,
of which about 0.2 percent (1,975) were secret (Breith 45-52). The total
number of secret patents declined during this period as did the total number
of granted patents. As a result, the share of total patents made up by secret
patents remained relatively constant, varying between 0.1 and 0.2 percent of
all patent grants.
France’s secret patents are managed by its Bureau des Brevets and Inven-
tions at the Ministry of Defense (Cochet-Grasset 17-28).17 Approximately
99 percent of its secret inventions come from Ministry of Defense employees
or contractors. In 1979 74 percent of secret invention applications came from
the Commissariat for Atomic Energy, 20 percent from other state employees,
5 percent from French industry (e.g., Thomson, SNECMA, Aerospatiale, and
ONERA.) and 1 percent from independent inventors of small and medium-
sized enterprises. From 1965 to 1984 the French Patent Office (INPI) granted
about 200,000 patents to French residents, of which about 0.6 percent (1,305)
were secret. France also issues secret patents to foreign applicants under con-
ditions established in agreements with foreign countries (Wuylens 161).18
16Many governments also limit commerce in military equipment and technology sales.
For the United States see International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR). Trade in
products and data that have both military and non-military importance are also limited.
For the United States see the export control regulations.
17Foreign patent recipients were excluded from the German and French data to facilitate
the comparison with Soviet data, which do not include foreign recipients.
18France has established the following agreements on secret patents: Sweden (15 March
1984), NATO (21 September 1961 and 19 October 1970), Federal Republic of Germany
(28 September 1961) and the United States (12 March 1957).
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The total number of French secret patents remained relatively small and
showed no noticeable trend (Wuylens 69). A 1980 statistical study of secret
patents from the 1970s revealed that one-fourth of them were declassified
within five years; one half, between five and ten years; and the remaining
fourth in 20 or more years (Wuylens 162).
Instead of granting secret patents, the United States government opted to
suspend any further treatment of applications and it forbids inventors from
publicly discussing their inventions. The use of secrecy orders stopped at the
close of the World War I only to restart as World War II loomed. A 1940 Act
re-instituted the prior war’s secrecy regime for patents, but it did so without
a reference to a formal state of war, which had been a previous precondition
to imposing secrecy orders. The Commissioner of Patents now had the power
to impose secrecy whenever he judged it important for national security. To
provide guidance determining which applications affected national defense,
the Commissioner of Patents requested to consult defense agency personnel
in an advisory board, today known as the Armed Services Patent Advisory
Board (ASPAB).
The creation of nuclear weapons fostered a consensus for a patent secrecy
regime after the war’s end and resulted in the Invention Secrecy Act of 1951,
which broadened past wartime practices. The ASPAB maintained a Patent
Security Category Review List and continued to provide guidance on all
relevant patent applications. The Act required U.S. citizens to file first with
the USPTO before filing abroad unless they obtained a special license.19
Applications were dealt with by the Licensing and Review Branch of the
Special Laws Administration Group, also known as Group 220. Reviews were
coordinated with other interested U.S. government agencies. This system has
largely remained in place with few changes.
The available official statistical data for U.S. secrecy orders show that a
relatively small share of total resident patent applications is affected. Of to-
tal resident patent applications (direct and PCT national phase entries) from
1985-2016 (5,723,684), there were 8963 new secrecy orders, which represent
about 0.1 percent of the total (Hausken 202 fn10; Aftergood; WIPO). Nev-
ertheless, the data also show that the rescission of orders increased shortly
after the end of the Cold War and sharply decreased after the 9/11 attack,
indicating that the terrorist attack led patent officials to broaden the reach
of national security concerns (Aftergood).20
19Other countries also require their citizens to file first in their home country before
filing abroad.
20From 1989-2000 recisions averaged 360 per year; from 2001-2016, 51 per year.
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3.1 USSR Patent Secrecy
The 1991 Soviet patent law, enacted just before the USSR’s dissolution, was
the product of lengthy discussions (Andrews); it ended socialism’s experi-
ment with inventor’s certificates and re-instituted patents as the sole form
of legal protection for inventions (Zakon). The new law also made a radical
change that escaped the attention of Western experts and received little dis-
cussion in the Soviet press: it ended secret Soviet inventions. Article 1, point
4 of the new law stated laconically: "Inventions that may contain informa-
tion that might harm the security of the U.S.S.R. should be made secret
according to procedures established by the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers."
What procedures? It didn’t say. One year later such procedures remained
unfinished, and the new 1992 Russian Federation patent law (Article 3, point
3) reiterated the need for them. The Russian government didn’t establish
new secrecy procedures until 2004 (Khromushina 61).
The abrupt abolition of secret patents reflected serious policy disputes.
Secret patents, after all, began at the outset of the Soviet Union. The 1924
Soviet patent law established secret patents for inventions relating to national
defense, not unlike those that other countries had instituted during World
War I (Postanovlenie, Article 37). Data from Russian archives show that
prior to central planning (1928), secret applications ranged from 1.4 to 3.6
percent of total patents (see figure 3). As noted above, a 1931 radical change
to the patent system introduced inventor’s certificates for Soviet citizens
(Polozheniya).
As fears of a new international war resurfaced and domestic political
violence gripped the Soviet political elite, questions arose about imposing
greater secrecy and restricting the dissemination of information on new So-
viet technologies. In the late 1930s the head of the People’s Commissariat for
Light Industry’s Invention Department sent an alarmist memo to top Party
officials calling for greater secrecy over all inventions. He was distressed, for
example, that foreigners could use his commissariat’s invention for process-
ing leather hides. “There is no doubt that they [foreigners] carefully follow
all of the branches of our national economy, especially inventing, and they
use whatever they find for their own needs”(RGAE 4372/92/133/1-3). He
proposed a system whereby information in inventor’s certificate documents
would be carefully restricted. His concern likely echoed the opinions of other
industry officials and perhaps resonated even more now that policies de-
emphasized the use of new technologies. “If present circumstances prevent
us from using our own technological developments, why should we make
them available to foreigners?” was undoubtedly a strong argument heard in
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Figure 3: The NEP Period: Annual Number of USSR Patent Applications
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favor of increasing secrecy.21
As noted above, increased secrecy accompanied the switch to central
planning and inventor’s certificates. The first two years of central planning
(1928-1929) saw a tripling of secrecy. Increased secrecy continued into the
1930s. Of the more than 126,000 inventor’s certificate applications made
between 1930 and 1935, over 9 percent were secret, an astoundingly high
share when compared to the less than 1 percent share in some developed
market economies.
Soviet invention secrecy expanded to include areas outside of direct mil-
itary application. In 1941 a redraft of the earlier invention law introduced a
new concept: “inventions not subject to publication.” Publishing information
on these inventions resulted in the same criminal charges (i.e., espionage) as
21A patent provides legal protection to make, use or sell an invention only in the coun-
try where it is issued. Inventors need to patent in each country where they want legal
protection.
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publishing information on secret inventions.
Military secrecy eased somewhat during the early post-war years, but
still remained unusually high. Secret inventor’s certificate applications sub-
mitted directly to the military in 1947 accounted for about twenty percent
of total applications. Furthermore, non-military inventions could also be de-
clared secret. An analysis of non-defense inventor’s certificates granted in
194722 revealed that ten percent of them were “inventions not subject to pub-
lication.” In other words, post-war officials considered information on thirty
percent of all Soviet inventions to be secret, a level of secrecy far greater
than that encountered in developed market economies.
The Khrushchev period (1958-1964) witnessed a slight relaxation in in-
vention secrecy, with slightly less than 10 percent of total invention appli-
cations secret (Martens, table A5.6). During this period the annual number
of new secret inventions continued to grow faster than the annual number of
older secret inventions being declassified. 23 Although new invention laws
were enacted, strict secrecy procedures remained. The 1959 revised inven-
tion statute kept the extremely broad regulations on secrecy established in
1941, as did the 1973 revised law. Article 42 from 1959 reiterated that the
Committee “may, with a view to safeguarding the interests of the State, ei-
ther postpone the publication of individual inventions or not publish them
at all.”
Soviet patent secrecy extended beyond restrictions imposed on the tech-
nical details of the inventions. Soviet officials also censored bibliographic in-
formation on published inventions, such as inventors’ and assignees’ names,
with some military applicants being identified only at a very general orga-
nizational level, such as the State Committee for Aviation Technology. Post
office box numbers, the designation system used to camouflage military in-
stitutes and enterprises, were rarely published and the actual facility names
remained secret. Many inventions, even non-military ones, left the inven-
tors’ organizations (zayavitel’ ) blank. Sometimes significant delays occurred
in publishing the full-specifications (opisaniye), which contained the most
explicit technical information, after the grant of an inventor’s certificate was
announced in the Committee’s official publication (Byulleten’ ). These de-
lays were another form of secrecy. The censorship rules were not spelled out
in any published decree, but were handled secretly by Glavlit, (the General
22Inventions with application numbers outside of the ranges reserved for secret inven-
tions registered at the Ministry of Defense (Martens, table 4.2).
23See Martens, Figure 7.8. Calculations of the Committee’s unpublished inventions were
difficult until 1970, when about 6 percent of the Committee’s grants were declared not
subject to publication.
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Directorate for the Protection of State Secrets in the Press). Although this
period witnessed a surge in the declassification of formerly secret military
inventions, the organizational names related to them generally remained se-
cret.
As the Soviet economy slumped, patent secrecy grew. The number of se-
cret invention applications, their share of total applications and censorship
grew during the immediate post-Khrushchev period. From 1965 to 1984 the
Ministry of Defense Invention Department received over 330,000 secret appli-
cations, which equaled about 14 percent of the total applications received by
the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries. The State Committee
received a rapidly growing number of applications considered “not subject
to publication” (NSTP). It is estimated that four-fifths of them were For
Official Use Only and one-fifth, secret (Russian Federation State Duma 78).
In 1970 only slightly more than one per cent (about 1,750 applications) of
the State Committee’s total applications were NSTP, but by 1984 this share
had increased to almost 19 percent (about 21,000).24
When Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary, Soviet socialism
confronted a barrier to economic growth that must have surprised most ar-
dent Communist Party members. The economy was proving incapable of
managing science and technology in the way their ideology had predicted.
Most striking, perhaps, was that socialism’s removal of profit barriers should
have launched a free flow of information, but it was nowhere to be seen.
In fact, invention data show that the Soviet Union had created its own,
stronger barriers of censorship and secrecy, a web that greatly hampered the
interchange of new ideas. Soviet socialism seemed a dead end, not a new
beginning.
Early in Gorbachev’s tenure as General Secretary, officials launched a
campaign of perestroika (restructuring) that included a policy of conver-
sion, i.e., requiring military-industrial enterprises to convert their output to
greater civilian production. Some conversion efforts aimed at selling dual-
use technologies, those useful to both defense and civilian customers. Such
programs necessarily required greater access to secret information. The gov-
ernment seemed poised to open what it imagined as a veritable treasure chest
of technologies previously closed by excessive secrecy. Reformers assumed
that valuable new technologies, hidden by Soviet secrecy, would generate
substantial profits on Western markets, thereby boosting Soviet economic
24About 18 percent of the State Committee’s NSTP applications consist of inventions
temporarily unpublished (two years or less). The NSTP estimate used here adjusted the
data by subtracting the temporarily unpublished applications from the total.
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growth. As one part of this effort the government designated Licensintorg,
the state licensing organization, to sell satellite services abroad. Officials
hoped that removing secrecy constraints would open other areas as well.
It appears that a cautious first step of perestroika was to redirect secret
Ministry of Defense data to the civilian State Committee. Data from the
Committee’s technical examination organization (VNIIGPE) further sug-
gest this early Gorbachev era challenge to the military-industrial complex’s
extreme secrecy regime. In 1986 the number of invention applications the
Committee handled in the three departments most closely tied to the defense
establishment – special techniques, radio electronics and technical physics –
increased dramatically.25 In addition, a new defense-related examination de-
partment, Special Electronics, was created. These VNIIGPE data present
further evidence of an early perestroika policy that redirected a large num-
ber of the Ministry of Defense’s secret and top-secret applications to the
civilian Committee for Inventions and Discoveries for examination. While
some secret inventions started out in the Ministry of Defense system and
were therefore included among the secret application numbers, they were
later sent to the Committee causing the jump in applications received by
defense-related examination areas. Not all of these inventions were declassi-
fied once in the Committee, but the Ministry of Defense’s default position
of determining secrecy was being challenged.26
Only weeks after the new patent law was passed, a coup was attempted
against General Secretary Gorbachev. The coup failed, Yeltsin came to
power and the Soviet Union collapsed on 26 December 1991. Secret appli-
cations to the Ministry of Defense for inventor’s certificates ended just prior
to the collapse, with the last published document dating from 28 June 1991.
The Russian Federation didn’t resolve the issues of patent secrecy until 2004.
3.2 GDR Patent Secrecy
The 1950 GDR patent law differed from the contemporaneous Soviet law
by having no provisions for secret patents. This difference followed logically
from the Potsdam Agreement’s demilitarization requirements for post-war
Germany. Since secret patents are usually granted for military technologies,
25Applications to the Special Techniques department (40-23) more than tripled from
1,384 applications in 1985 to 6,677 in 1986. Radio Electronics (26-9) grew from 2,046 to
3,398; Technical Physics (26-25), 3,916 to 5,425. (Korchagin).
26Maintaining secrecy, possibly just a FOUO classification, likely explains the upswing
in the number of NSTP grants by the Committee for Inventions and Discoveries during
the perestroika campaign.
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the GDR law didn’t need to include them. Furthermore, Soviet officials
likely recalled their country’s heroic efforts to relocate much of their defense
production to the Urals during World War II. Soviet military planners prob-
ably viewed the GDR’s proximity to the West as a strategic weakness and
disincentive to defense-industrial investments, a judgment further reinforced
when the FRG joined NATO in 1955. Military planners also shared their
citizens’ general mistrust of all foreigners, even those from fellow Warsaw
Pact countries.
Section 29(4) of the basic 1950 GDR law allowed inventors to request
a delay in the issuance of the patent specifications.27 Delaying publication
paralleled the Soviet practice of declaring that some granted inventor’s cer-
tificates were “not subject to publication,” a supple form of secrecy that
didn’t require an official to stamp “Secret” or "For Official Use" on the doc-
uments. It’s not clear if AfEP’s Hauptabteilung I (HA I), which processed
all of the GDR’s secret patent applications, had any role in suppressing the
timely publication of applications under Section 23 (1983).
Soviet reluctance to allow GDR defense-related production slackened by
1963 when the GDR revised its patent law to permit secret patents for “in-
ventions that directly or indirectly secure the defensive preparation” of the
country. As one German legal expert observed: “The timing [of the GDR
legal change] is nevertheless conspicuous as it followed closely on the building
of the Berlin Wall and the West German introduction of secret patents in
1961” (Breith 28).
The 1963 GDR law at first restricted the subject matter for secret patents
to defense technologies, a narrower sphere than covered by the Soviet law
at the time. That narrow definition didn’t last long, however, for in 1968 a
special decree on secret patents expanded the subject matter to include eco-
nomic secrets that “affected other state interests,” a broad formulation that
echoed Soviet practices (Breith 29). This decree was later incorporated in a
new 1983 law. The rationale behind the expanded coverage was explained
as follows by Wiedemann and Zobel in a dissertation that was supervised by
the GDR patent office official who oversaw secret patents in AfEP’s HA I:
“Secrecy serves to deny the adversary access to scientific-
technical results. Maintaining secrecy is a proper means to secure
an achieved technological advantage over capitalist competitors
in order to surprise the adversaries in markets and eliminate them
27This practice became Section 23 on “Publication” of the 1983 patent law. “The patent
publication can be delayed when accompanied by a well-documented request” (Paten-
trecht) 12).
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as competitors. Furthermore, the capitalist businesses should
be given no possibility to enrich themselves at the expense of
the work of GDR employees by appropriating their scientific-
technical achievements” (Wiedemann and Zobel 50-51). 28
Wiedemann and Zobel noted that Western firms often protect their tech-
nologies with trade secrets, but this type of protection does not give firms
the benefits of priority that come with secret patents. A secret patent would
allow the GDR to block any foreigner who would try to make, use or sell an
equivalent invention with a later application date on GDR territory.
The GDR’s system for secret economic patents was decentralized and
gave enterprise directors and the heads of research institutes the authority
to determine which patents would be declared secret on economic grounds
(Klinger §7 para 4, 129). Economic secrecy was evidently less stringent than
national defense secrecy. Enterprise directors were permitted to discuss their
secret economic patents with other potential users in the GDR. They could
also opt to delay the publication of some of their non-secret applications.
Of course, such an effort might slow down the circulation of technological
information among potential users; however, for the GDR, a relatively small
country where top specialists generally knew each other, the concern about
information exchange was less important than in a larger economy such as the
Soviet Union. Still, it’s reasonable to ask if economic policy makers were in a
position to identify correctly which technologies should be classified as secret
or subject to publication restrictions. With expanded secrecy coverage, GDR
law had fallen largely in line with Soviet law. How the law would be applied
in practice remained an open question.
Soviet and GDR officials weren’t alone in fearing that their technologies
strengthened their adversaries’ economies. In 2012 the U.S. Congress asked
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to “examine the
feasibility of placing economically significant patents under a secrecy order,”
which led the USPTO to issue a request for public comments” (Federal Reg-
ister 23662-23665). More specifically, Congress asked “whether the United
States should identify and bar from publication certain patent applications
as detrimental to the nation’s economic security.” French governments have
resisted such an extension of secrecy.29 Two critics of globalization and the
28The dissertation adviser was R. Rosenthal, Head of AfEP’s secret department (Haupt-
abteilung I).
29Although not precluded by law, the French Ministry for the Economy and Finance
and the Ministry for Health have never sought the powers to restrict the publication and
use of patent applications in the same way accorded to the Ministry of Defense (Wuylens
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current U.S. patent system championed this change.30 Among the published
comments, IBM Corporation’s Chief Patent Counsel voiced opposition to the
proposal in terms which could well describe the difficulties faced by Soviet
and GDR government officials with their system:
“Inventors and/or rights-holders are in the best position to
evaluate the optimal means for protection, including when and if
to maintain secrecy, and the patent system gives them the flexi-
bility to do so. Unlike inventions impacting national security, the
government has no special expertise in analyzing the economic
value of an invention or the need to keep it secret. Neither the
USPTO nor any other government body can do a better job de-
termining how best to exploit an invention than the inventor who
stands to reap the rewards of that invention.”31
3.3 Secret Patents as Share of Total GDR Patents
As noted above, the GDR’s laws on secret patenting evolved to resemble
Soviet laws; yet the GDR officials were to some extent still rooted in ear-
lier German traditions. Did GDR practices resemble how Soviet officials
managed secret patents or were GDR practices influenced by their earlier
history and more Western orientation? To examine this issue, we compared
the share of all domestic patents comprised by secret patents in the two
countries. Although the relatively smaller importance of defense industrial
production in the GDR should result in a relatively smaller share of secret
inventions, similar GDR and Soviet secrecy practices should also result in a
strikingly larger share of secret patents in the GDR than is found in Western
economies.
After the collapse of the GDR government, HA I’s director, Colonel
Rosenthal, destroyed the official register of secret patents and many internal
HA I documents, thereby making it impossible to establish precisely how
130).
30Pat Choate, director of the Manufacturing Policy Project and past vice presidential
candidate for the Reform Party, and the American Innovators for Patent Reform (AIPR)
are linked to the proposal.
31Schecter, Manny W. and Marian Underweiser, IBM Corporation Comments in re-
sponse to “Notice of Request for Comments on the Feasibility of Placing Economically
Significant Patents Under a Secrecy Order and the Need to Review Criteria Used in De-
termining Secrecy Orders Related to National Security,” June 1, 2012, 77 Fed. Reg. 23662
(April 20, 2012). web.archive.org/web/20170628054956/ www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-
started/international-protection/economic-security-so
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many secret patents the GDR had granted. The Appendix below describes
in more detail how we derived an estimation without the HA I official register
or internal HA I reports.
According to Hans-Jürgen Breith, in his general legal survey of how state
secrets are protected by invention and utility patents, on 3 October 1990 the
950 remaining files for secret GDR patents and patent applications were
transferred to the FRG’s DPMA in Munich. He noted that the DPMA con-
sidered about 500 of them to involve subject matter outside of technological
areas needing secrecy protection and it quickly published them. The DPMA
then notified the inventors of 382 other patents or patent applications of its
intent to declassify them; since nobody appealed, these were also published.
The FRG Ministry of Defense inherited the remaining 68 secret patents, and
kept only three of them as temporarily secret. Those final three have since
been declassified. The rapid declassification actions by FRG officials suggest
that the GDR’s view of what technological areas secrecy should cover was
broader than that of FRG and other market economies and would lead one
to expect a greater share of secret patents in the GDR.
DPMA (Deutsches Patent und Markenamt, Geschäftsstelle 99) officials
provided us with a list of application numbers for 930 secret GDR patents,
which closely resembles the number of secret patents cited by Breith. No
background was provided on how the list was created. While Breith’s char-
acterization of GDR secrecy practices suggested that GDR officials imposed
secrecy somewhat more frequently than their FRG counterparts, we needed
to establish if the DPMA list was comprehensive. Did it include most of the
secret patents that would have been found in the HA I register? If not, we
can’t use 930 to estimate precisely what share of total GDR patents is made
up by secret patents.
A brief examination of three important GDR technology-intensive firms,
Carl Zeiss Jena, VEB Chemieanlagenbau Kombinat Leipzig-Grimma and
VEB Spezialtechnik, revealed that their patenting to be underrepresented in
the DPMA list. The missing patent information was evidently destroyed
when the GDR regime collapsed. Our next task was to examine the extent
of the missing information.
We had access to the Carl Zeiss Jena Patentregister in which secret
patents are identified and we also created a random sample of published
GDR applications. If Carl Zeiss Jena can be considered representative of
GDR industry and if the random sample is valid, then total secret GDR
patents might be about twice those represented solely by the DPMA list,
i.e., 1.2 percent instead of 0.6 percent of total GDR patents.
We also had other information that could give us insights into GDR se-
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cret patent policy. The Carl Zeiss Jena Patentregister contained data on
patenting in its U-Betrieb (see Appendix for details), which was established
at Zeiss in the 1980s as the Soviet Union pressured GDR officials to devote
more resources to military technologies. The U-Betrieb concentrated on mil-
itary technologies, such as those used in guidance systems for rocket nose
cones. Reflecting typical Soviet secrecy practices, the Carl Zeiss Jena Paten-
tregister only published ranges of register numbers for U-Betrieb patents, no
details. It recorded 687 U-Betrieb patents. If all U-Betrieb patent appli-
cations were secret, then the share of secret inventions for Carl Zeiss Jena
would be about 13.5 percent. This assumption, while certainly extreme,
forms a convenient upper boundary for our estimation.
Carl Zeiss Jena was one of the GDR’s most prominent facilities and
hardly representative of the rest of the industry. To project this upper
boundary for secret inventions onto GDR industry as a whole ignores that
much of the GDR’s industry supported the agricultural and other civilian
sectors. It seems that secret patents comprised less than 13.5 percent of
total GDR patents, but we’re unable to state precisely how much less. Still,
at least we have arrived at an upper boundary that is useful in comparing
GDR practices with Soviet practices.
We can assert with some confidence that the share of total GDR patents
comprised by secret patents equalled between 1.2 percent to 13.5 percent of
total patents, a range somewhat greater than that found in some developed
market economies (0.1 to 0.6 percent), but far smaller that that of the So-
viet Union (36 percent of total domestic inventor’s certificates). Since Carl
Zeiss Jena was a leading GDR technology-intensive firm, we expect the ac-
tual share of secret patents to be considerably below the upper boundary
derived from Carl Zeiss Jena data. The lower level of GDR secret patenting
likely reflects the GDR’s relatively smaller defense-industrial economy and
the influence of German cultural differences.
4 Quantum Electronics and Laser Technology: Il-
lustrating Soviet and GDR Innovation Difficul-
ties and Secrecy
Lasers present a concrete example that illustrates how the Soviet and GDR
patent systems struggled to promote technological progress and how they
dealt with secrecy concerns. Quantum electronics was a new scientific field
with important commercial and defense potential and Soviet and GDR eco-
nomic policy makers believed that it deserved priority development.
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Three American (Charles Townes, Gordon Gould and Theodore Maiman)
and three Soviet physicists (Aleksandr M. Prokhorov, Nikolay G. Basov and
Valentin A. Fabrikant) are generally recognized for having made unusually
important early contributions to the field of quantum electronics and to the
development of lasers.32 In addition to scientific publications, they obtained
important patents, for each envisioned valuable future applications – new
scientific instrumentation, medical devices, guidance systems, materials sci-
ences tools, etc. - from their research. Many other physicists and engineers
quickly contributed to the new field and some of them, in addition to pub-
lishing their research results, sought patent protection, either directly or
through their employers.33
In the United States the government and private industry began funding
laser-related research soon after the scientific breakthrough was reported.
Some U.S. government money created secret projects subject to government
restrictions while other U.S. government funds went to unclassified projects,
with considerable Defense Department funding going to both classified and
unclassified research. Private funding also flowed to laser research as its com-
mercial potential became quickly understood by business leaders. Funding
decisions were decentralized and if one start-up group failed to find funding
through one source, it might well succeed with other sources. Corporations
also sensed new opportunities and quickly expanded their own in-house re-
search efforts. Looking back in 2010 on quantum electronics, Charles Townes
observed: “I did realize that the laser had wider applications such as com-
munications and cutting and welding, but I never envisaged the breadth of
applications for which it is used today.”
One account of the early days of laser research describes a gold rush
atmosphere with the founding of many new, small companies focused on
laser research. Some U.S. scientists with an entrepreneurial bent went into
business for themselves. “If these clucks can run a company, so can we,”
opined Larry Goldmuntz, a U.S. physicist and start-up leader (Taylor 74).
Small companies, facing relatively low barriers to entry, made important
basic and applied research breakthroughs. Some of them prospered and
grew larger; others floundered or were taken over by larger operations. The
scientific personnel often moved easily among the firms (Bromberg 124 ff).
The new laser field witnessed the destruction of the traditional bound-
32Townes, Prokhorov and Basov shared a Nobel Prize. Fabrikant’s contributions are
described in Lukishova, 10045s and Pogrebysskaya. Gould’s contributions, in Taylor and
Maiman’s in Bromberg 91-96 and Inventor Profile.
33Early laser developments occurring in the United States are described in detail by
Joan Bromberg (Bromberg).
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aries among many fields and in the more bureacratic USSR and GDR, tra-
ditions hindered those scientists who tried to step over the boundaries (Al-
brecht 62). A Soviet labor book (Soviet - trudovaya knizhka was maintained
by employers and could be used to hinder job changes; nothing like it faced
U.S. scientists establishing start-ups. U.S. scientists simply gave a week’s
or a month’s notice before taking up a new job and the new employers, not
the state, assessed their job qualifications. U.S. scientists also faced no gov-
ernment restrictions on their right to move to any U.S. city, whereas their
Soviet scientific colleagues might have had to navigate internal passport re-
quirements before moving to a job in another city. Finding new laboratory
space was also easier for U.S. scientists, for they could tap into an open
real estate market, another advantage unavailable to Soviet and GDR scien-
tists. Finally, U.S. scientists could readily access a service sector of financial
specialists, lawyers and accountants who were experienced in establishing
new businesses. No such service sector existed in the Soviet Union or GDR,
where the government blocked private enterprise. As a result, commercially-
oriented laser research quickly blossomed in the United States, whereas it
had to navigate formidable bureaucratic challenges in the Soviet Union and
GDR.
New firms, established companies, individuals and the government quickly
sought to protect the commercialization of their efforts by filing laser-related
patents. Between 1956 and 1976 the annual number of US Patent and Trade-
mark Office laser-related patent applications from U.S. inventors grew from
5 to over 200. The total for the entire period was 3,141 applications, of which
only eleven were from the USSR and six from the GDR.34
Soviet and GDR organizations were slow to patent laser-related inven-
tions in their respective countries and their domestic patenting reached only
two percent of U.S. levels during the ten-year period that followed Charles
Townes’ original application (1956-1966). The GDR had less than 10 percent
of the USSR’s population, but its inventors obtained almost half as many
laser related patents as Soviet inventors obtained during those early years.
As is discussed in more detail below, secrecy policies may have hidden a
more active Soviet patenting effort.
Patent activity picked up for both the Soviet Union and GDR during
the next ten years, but their totals for the entire 1956-1976 period remained
34We define laser-related to be those applications belonging to the International Patent
Classification subclass H01S (Devices Using Stimulated Emission). Furthermore, only
those applications that successfully passed the patent office technical examination are
counted. The Depatis online database was used to make the selection. Hard currency
restrictions undoubtedly reduced patenting in the West by USSR and GDR inventors.
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Figure 4: Number of U.S., U.S.S.R. and GDR Laser-Related (H01S) Patents




















quite low compared to those of the market economies. Since overall patent
activity in the Soviet Union between 1956 and 1976 was half that of the
United States, one might expect the Soviet Union to have had half as many
laser-related inventions as United States.35 Yet, the United States reported
3,141 laser-related grants to its citizens; the Soviet Union, 285 (See figure 4).
The GDR, a much smaller country, recorded 116 laser-related applications
from its citizens.36
35Inventors in both countries were strongly motivated to patent, for commercial reasons
in the United States and to meet central planning success indicators in the Soviet Union.
Total USSR inventors certificate grants in 1976 roughly equaled U.S. origin patent grants
for that year.
36In 1963 the GDR ended technical examinations for all applications, requiring them
only if requested by the applicant, if the application was challenged by a third party, or
if a bonus were to be paid. This change to the Offenlegungsschrift system likely created
an upward bias in the GDR patent data when compared to the United States and Soviet
Union, which continued their technical examinations of all applications, rejecting some
of them for lack of novelty, etc. To avoid double counting, we only used data for the
Offenlegungsschrift.
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Half of Soviet laser-related inventions failed to identify the originating
facility, making it difficult to characterize accurately what types of facilities
were most active in patenting. Of the laser-related patents that identified the
originating facilities, most came from Academy of Sciences and educational
research organizations. In the GDR two organizations, Carl Zeiss Jena and
the GDR Academy of Sciences (the Center for Scientific Instruments and
the Central Institute of Optics and Spectroscopy) accounted for almost all
of the GDR’s laser-related patent activity. Since neither the Soviet Union
nor the GDR permitted private enterprise, the advent of quantum electronics
did not spur the founding of new companies, but instead motivated existing
research institutes and factories to petition their superior organizations for
new laboratories and equipment. If at some point an entirely new institute
were to be proposed, it might well unleash bureaucratic squabbling over its
administrative affiliation. The patent activity data in figure 4 suggest that
this lack of flexibility from over-centralization greatly impeded the rapid
development of laser technology in the USSR and GDR.
U.S. university and government organizations accounted for slightly un-
der 15 percent of U.S. laser-related inventions during this period, although
government funding certainly played a role in the research being done in
many of the companies owning patents.37 Ten U.S. companies accounted for
just over 40 percent of the laser-related patents; whereas individual inven-
tors and small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for almost one-fifth
of them. An array of large and medium-sized companies comprised the
remaining forty percent of the U.S. laser-related patent holders. The sig-
nificant participation of individuals and small and medium-sized enterprises
constitutes a striking difference to the Soviet Union’s use of its Academy of
Sciences and universities and the GDR’s highly centralized industrial and
scientific establishment.
In the Soviet Union’s and the GDR’s more hierarchical system, there
practically no opportunities for young Soviet and GDR scientists to wave
good-bye to the “clucks” running the show and start building their own laser
companies. They certainly couldn’t easily decamp to a foreign country. The
Soviet and GDR societies were staid, respectful of existing hierarchies, and
they generally rewarded those who could work within existing organizational
structures. To join any scientific gold rush, scientists would first require con-
vincing numerous superior organizations, from those in one’s own institute
37The United States has no organization analogous to the Soviet Academy of Sciences.
Some U.S. government organizations have their own laboratories and appear as assignees
to inventions. Bromberg emphasizes the role of government spending, especially by the
military, for the U.S. post-WWII electronics industry (Bromberg 2 ff).
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to those in the state’s central planning organizations. Nevertheless, an early
GDR laser pioneer, Kurt Lenz, proved an exception by creating the GDR’s
first functioning laser without direct establishment support and by success-
fully avoiding the pinch of Western technology embargoes (Albrecht 87).
The large observed difference between U.S. and Soviet domestic laser re-
lated patent activity may also stem from another somewhat hidden issue –
state secrecy. In developed market economies such as the United States a
general openness surrounds many scientific breakthroughs, even some with
potential military importance. The rapid development of new technologies
by firms competing for financial gain is understood to benefit all, civilian
as well as defense industries. Soviet central planning, on the other hand,
was determined by the Communist Party’s priorities and often deferred to
its defense-industrial and national security leadership, who took a more se-
cretive approach, censoring the names of many laboratories or facilities and
stamping much research as secret. GDR central planning was also stifling,
but it oversaw a relatively smaller defense-industrial establishment and fo-
cused less on the military.
4.1 Lasers and State Secrecy
4.1.1 Valentin Fabrikant, Gordon Gould and Paul Görlich: Three
Researchers, Victims of Excessive Security Measures
Governments rely on their counterintelligence officials to catch citizens who
betray secrets to foreign governments or whom they deem untrustworthy
in handling the state’s secrets. It’s a difficult job and often lacks clear-cut
evidence. Rarely are there news accounts of counterintelligence officials be-
ing punished for wrongly accusing individuals of lacking trustworthiness, an
accusation generally based on intuitive judgments that can be clouded by
prejudice or personal antipathy. This lack of checks and balances sometimes
makes it easier for counterintelligence officials to assume guilt on the part
of the people they are investigating. Defense officials recognized very early
that laser research could have important military as well as commercial ap-
plications and in the Soviet Union, the United States and the GDR this
realization set in motion counterintelligence surveillance over laser research
programs.
Valentin Aleksandrovich Fabrikant, one of the world’s earliest laser pio-
neers, applied for a seminal laser-related inventor’s certificate in 1951, but
he soon ran into security problems. His father, Aleksandr Osipovich, was
re-arrested and according to Soviet practices that made Valentin Aleksan-
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drovich a security risk. Moreover, Fabrikant was Jewish and the early 1950s
had witnessed a reaction to Zionism from top Party officials, many of whom
began to question the loyalty of Jewish fellow citizens.38 Fabrikant’s 1951
inventor’s certificate application was at first rejected, then declared secret
and finally published as two separate inventions in 1959 and 1962.39 Fab-
rikant was subsequently honored by the Soviet Union through the award of
an official discovery in 1962.
Secrecy also shadowed some U.S. laser research. Gordon Gould, an early
laser pioneer and gifted inventor, had dropped his dissertation work to join
the laser gold rush. He ran into significant problems when his early project,
which depended on government funding, was declared secret and he failed
to get a security clearance because of past political views. The government’s
denial of a clearance meant that Gould could not work directly on his own
project and his full talents were left underutilized. It also meant that while
a stripped down version of his patent application moved forward, the larger,
more comprehensive application remained in abeyance until the project was
declassified, which occurred after a relatively short period of several years.40
Gould subsequently continued to openly patent his ideas.
As mentioned above, the Soviet Union’s war reparations policy included
shipping equipment from German industrial facilities to the USSR. The Zeiss
Jena factory’s equipment was sent to Krasnogorsk, a center of the Soviet
military’s optical work. Paul Görlich, who had worked at Zeiss, was recruited
to work in Krasnogorsk. Afterwards he headed Carl Zeiss Jena, taught at
the Friedrich Schiller University and was a director of the GDR’s Academy
of Sciences’ Institut for Optics and Spectroscopy. In spite of his scientific
accomplishments and expertise, the East German Stasi subjected him to
considerable surveillance (Albrecht 44 and 151), not least, perhaps, because
of his previous membership in the Nazi party (Augustine 157), but also
38The Soviet leadership at first supported an independent state of Israel, but reconsid-
ered its support when it became clear that Israel was going to be aligned with the United
States. At that moment Soviet leaders viewed Jews as a potential fifth column and began
to persecute prominent Jewish citizens. (Sebag Montefiore 558-562).
39New Soviet inventions were first announced in the official publication (Byulleten’ izo-
breteniy), but only an abstract was printed. The full-specifications (opisaniye), which
came closest to enabling “any person skilled in the art or science to which the invention
appertains . . . to make and use the same,” were sometimes published with significant
delays and resembled yet another form of Soviet secrecy. The full-specifications for Fab-
rikant’s 1951 application appeared as No.123209 in 1959 and No.148441, in 1962. The
file wrapper shows that the inventions had been declared secret (Pogrebysskaya 500 and
Lukishova 5).
40Email correspondence with Gordon Gould’s patent lawyer, Bob Keegan, 23 October
2018.
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because the Stasi began in 1962 to focus increased surveillance over all laser
research (Albrecht fn 87). Görlich may also have offended Party ideologues
by his insistence, contrary to Marxist-Leninist principles, that GDR laser
research not be shared freely with fraternal socialist countries, especially
the USSR.41 His views on the matter were reported by a Stasi informer
(Albrecht 202). Görlich hoped to position the GDR favorably in exploiting
laser research in trade with other CMEA countries.
Other important Soviet inventors saw much of their work classified. Alek-
sandr Prokhorov, who shared a Nobel Prize with Charles Townes and Niko-
lai Basov, witnessed some of his later laser-related inventions suffer from the
heavy hand of the Soviet censor. Seven of his eleven published inventions
were revealed only after the Soviet Union’s collapse and three of them came
from the separate Ministry of Defense secret invention department. Two
of these Ministry of Defense inventions, 451647 and 478575, had remained
secret for over thirty years. Many of Prokhorov’s inventions probably still
remain secret. We have found no evidence of Prokhorov suffering any perse-
cution by counterintelligence officials beyond strict censorship.
4.1.2 Using Patent Data to Understand the Scope of Laser Se-
crecy
To remain competitive, businesses carefully restrict access to information
on new, commercially important scientific breakthroughs. Patent protection
offers businesses an incentive, through a temporary monopoly, to share in-
formation which otherwise would remain closely held. Shortly after scientific
journals reported on quantum electronics breakthroughs, many researchers
published their achievements as patent applications, garnering both profes-
sional recognition and possible financial rewards.
Governments, too, are interested in exploiting new technologies, espe-
cially those considered militarily important. When laser-related research
began, governments needed to decide which areas appeared militarily criti-
cal, a difficult task in a nascent industry. Under U.S. law, the government
can invoke a secrecy order, stopping the publication of information from any
patent application deemed important to the military. In the Soviet Union
and the GDR, as in some other countries, a patent could be declared secret.
Published patent data allow an assessment of the extent to which Soviet
41It appears that Soviet officials, too, avoided even more sharing laser technology in-
formation with allies. Soviet researchers applied for only two GDR laser-related patents
prior to 1976; during this period, GDR researchers applied for seven Soviet inventor’s
certificates (EPO Espacenet).
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secrecy affected laser-related research. Such an assessment needs to take
into account the Soviet Union’s two patent systems: one run by the Min-
istry of Defense, and the other, by the State Committee for Inventions and
Discoveries.
As mentioned above, from 1936 to 1991 the Soviet Ministry of Defense
administered a parallel, secret patent system and fewer than one percent
of the inventor’s certificates granted by this system have been published.
We estimate that the Ministry of Defense granted at least 120,000 patents
during the 1956-76 period (Martens, table A5.9). According to OECD data
for 1976-1989, laser related inventions (IPC H01S) accounted for about 0.32
percent of total OECD area applications to the EPO.42 If this share were true
for the Soviet Union, one would expect about 380 declassified Ministry of
Defense laser-related patents. Yet, the Ministry of Defense has declassified
only 12 laser-related inventions from this period, reflecting its extremely
strict secrecy regime.
An analysis of the laser patent data of the Soviet State Committee for In-
ventions and Discoveries reveals that secrecy concerns weighed heavily there,
too. As mentioned above, the State Committee was also empowered to im-
pose secrecy on inventions. Some of the inventions examined by the State
Committee came from defense-industrial research organizations, although
Soviet censorship attempted to hide these connections.43 Between 1970 and
1989 the State Committee granted over 1.2 million inventor’s certificates.
Using the OECD data showing that lasers (H01S) comprise about 0.32 per-
cent of patents, the State Committee might well have issued over 3,800 grants
for laser technologies; yet, it granted only 460, a further indication of how
secrecy may have affected the dissemination of information on Soviet laser
research.
The Soviet Union’s patent system included technical examinations for
all applications. The period of time between the application and publication
dates generally reflected the time needed for this technical examination. The
average examination time for laser patents (8 years) was excessive, suggest-
ing a reluctance to release information. The USPTO examined laser-related
patents in 2.7 years, not too different from the average examination regu-
42Earlier patent data not available. OECD, "Patents by main technology and by Inter-
national Patent Classification (IPC)", OECD Patent Statistics (OECD).
43Many Soviet defense-industrial research organizations were identified by a system of
post office boxes created to obscure their defense activities. Some online information has
revealed p.o. box numbers (pochtoviy yashchik or p-ya) that are missing from the printed
documentation. State Committee examined laser inventions listed p-ya 3726, p-ya 6681,
p-ya 3695 and p-ya 8584.
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lar Soviet patents (2.2 years).44 It took more than 20 years to publish 20
laser-related patents handled by the State Committee during the 1956-72,
suggesting that these inventions had been secret.
Soviet laser-related inventions differed markedly from U.S. and GDR in-
ventions in another way – the names of the developing organizations were
heavily censored. Soviet censors maintained comprehensive lists of indus-
trial facilities and research organizations that, because they belonged to the
defense-industrial or national security establishment, could not be mentioned
in print. About 51 percent of laser-related inventions failed to name any as-
signee or developing organization; whereas only 34 percent of inventions in
a random sample of Soviet inventions did so. An analysis of the inventors
listed in laser-related inventions helped identify some of the missing organi-
zational names and confirmed that many were related to the Soviet defense
establishment.45
While our GDR patent data are incomplete, the number of laser-related
inventions is fairly close to what one would expect based on the country’s
overall patent activity.46 At the early stages of the GDR laser program, Carl
Zeiss Jena appears to have made use of its authority to delay the publication
of its laser-related patents. The average time between the application and
publication for the 1962-1970 period was 3.3 years; while for the 1971-1990
period, it was 1.8 years. 47 These delays are relatively small compared to
the Soviet ones mentioned above.
Other comparisons reveal a more relaxed GDR approach to secrecy. From
1982 on, when the GDR began listing originating facility names on patent
publications, no censorship occurred for laser-related inventions. The Patent
Register at Carl Zeiss Jena, a principal GDR laser developer, revealed no
secret laser patents48 and no laser patents were included in the DPMA list of
930 secret GDR patents. GDR patent officials, unlike their Soviet counter-
parts, appear to have sparingly imposed secrecy on laser technology research.
Two U.S. laser-related inventions from Lockheed and from Northrop
44See Figure 7.5 Examination Times for a Random Sample of Soviet Inventor’s Certifi-
cates from 1974 to 1978 in Martens, p. 154.
45Thanks to the Russian government’s greater openness or glasnost’ campaign, we were
able to identify the following organizations: Istok, p-ya 8584, NII-801, Institute of Radion-
avigation and Time (RIRT), NII-4 MO, Moscow Scientific-Research Institute for Radio
Communications, and the Institute for Precision Instrument Engineering.
46We have no total GDR patent application data prior to 1970.
47Using a z-test for two means, with known population standard deviations, this differ-
ence is statistically different at the 95 percent level.
48As mentioned above no detailed patent data is available for the 687 inventions from
the Carl Zeiss Jena’s U-Betrieb.
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Grumman were published after more than 25 years had elapsed from the
date of application, suggesting strongly that they had been under secrecy
orders. Data on secrecy orders between 1956 and 1976 aren’t available, but
in 1979 3,513 secrecy orders were in effect, which likely includes most orders
from the 1956-1976 period. Using the OECD statistics, we estimate that
14 laser-related secrecy orders were in effect on laser-related inventions and
that the subsequent Lockheed and Northrop Grumman patents were among
those orders.
The laser industry’s development in two centrally-planned economies,
the USSR and the GDR, reflects how central planning struggled to match
the performance of market economies in technological innovation. Central
planning’s insistence on controls from the top thwarted or delayed the type
of bubbling up of initiative found in the market economies. Scientists and
engineers in the centrally planned economies were sometimes at the forefront
of new ideas, but as figure 4 shows, their contributions toward industrial ap-
plication as reflected in patenting lagged considerably behind their peers in
market economies. In addition, USSR scientists and engineers faced exces-
sive secrecy that also acted as a damper on disseminating new technologies.
Secrecy appears to have been a smaller issue in the GDR, but that country’s
top-down hierarchical structure likely impeded initiatives from below. Cen-
sorship and secrecy weighed more heavily on Soviet laser-related technologies
in comparison with U.S. and GDR practices.
5 Summary and Conclusions
The development of the GDR’s patent system shows the clear influence of
the Soviet Union’s economic model, with the GDR’s Socialist Unity Party
(SED) setting overall economic priorities and administering the economy
through a central plan. The Soviet dual system of patents for foreigners and
inventor’s certificates for citizens was also copied, as were the use of patents
as success indicators and the efforts to achieve technological diffusion by
central administrative actions.
The GDR was not, however, a pure imitation of the Soviet Union, but
a country with its own culture and traditions that could result in differing
approaches to important economic and social issues. It should serve as a
reminder to outside observers that lumping today’s communist countries
together without recognizing their differences is an oversimplification that
may cloud our understanding of them. Judging from the available materials,
patenting and patent secrecy were issues on which GDR practices sometimes
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differed from those of the Soviet Union.
The Soviet and GDR management of secret patents appears to have
differed as follows: (1) the GDR patent office had no counterpart to the
Soviet military’s separate invention department; the GDR system was ad-
ministered through a single state organization, the Amt für Erfindungs- und
Patentwesen (AfEP); (2) GDR enterprise directors appear to have had wide
discretion in making secrecy decisions, whereas Soviet decision-making on
secrecy appears to have been directed by central authorities; (3) GDR se-
crecy sometimes was connected to specific GDR political sensitivities, such
as devices related to border security or citizen surveillance; (4) the GDR had
no extensive system of codenames to hide entire enterprises and institutes
from the public; and (5) GDR secrecy affected a far smaller share of total
inventions than did Soviet secrecy.
We believe that our study provides the first cross-national, quantitative
study of state secrecy, albeit for the highly specific area of patent secrecy.
Our analysis of patent data shows that Soviet officials invoked patent secrecy
far more frequently (about 36 percent of total grants) than did government
officials in several developed market economies (France, Germany, United
Kingdom and the United States - from 0.1 to 0.6 percent of total grants),
suggesting that market economies, contrary to what Marxist-Leninist ide-
ology depicted, promoted the unfettered dissemination of information more
vigorously than did centrally-planned economies.
Although GDR officials imposed secrecy on technological areas not usu-
ally considered secret by market economy officials, they did so less than did
their Soviet counterparts (about 1.2 to 13.5 percent of total GDR grants were
secret). In limiting patent secrecy, perhaps drawing upon more open Ger-
man scientific and administrative traditions, GDR officials evidently viewed
excessive secrecy as counterproductive.
A brief comparison of Soviet and GDR patent policies in the new and
potentially important field of lasers highlights significant differences between
the secrecy policies of the two countries, both with each other and with mar-
ket economies. A major study of early U.S. laser developments (Bromberg)
describes an active, open exchange of information among U.S. scientists, who
organized conferences, both national and international, and seemed gener-
ally unencumbered by state secrecy regulations. As noted in a history of
German laser developments (Albrecht), the GDR began to face increasing
scientific isolation at the start of its laser programs, which occurred con-
temporaneously with the building of the Berlin Wall. The GDR’s secrecy
for laser technologies nevertheless appears relatively light-handed compared
to Soviet practices. GDR laser-related patents comprised about the same
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share of total patents as found in many market economies, whereas domestic
laser inventions were greatly underrepresented in the Soviet patent informa-
tion. The Carl Zeiss Jena Patentregister contained no secret laser patents,
although its laser patents often had publication delays; no laser patents were
included in the DPMA’s list of secret GDR patents.
Some GDR enterprise officials did invoke secrecy to shield laser develop-
ments from their Soviet allies in an effort to protect what they believed to
be important export markets within the CMEA and possibly beyond. Here
GDR national interest trumped fraternal socialist cooperation, for the rela-
tively small GDR economy struggled to develop sources of foreign currency
earnings. Soviet officials also ignored fraternal socialist cooperation in laser
developments, applying for almost no laser Wirtschaftpatente in the GDR.
Since much of the Soviet Union’s laser research was conducted in secret in-
stitutes, secrecy undoubtedly presented a barrier to such cooperation, even
with its allied countries.
U.S. laser developments originated foremost in businesses, both existing
and newly founded small and medium-sized enterprises and in large corpo-
rations. U.S. government and educational organizations were also important
contributors to laser technology. This early organizational history, described
in detail by Bromberg and Albrecht, is reflected in the information on U.S.
patent assignees. Patent assignee data for Soviet and GDR domestic patent-
ing provides a contrasting organizational picture, showing very few initia-
tives outside of existing hierarchies. The Academy of Sciences, educational
facilities and one industrial enterprise, Carl Zeiss Jena, accounted for the
GDR’s laser developments; the Academy of Sciences, educational facilities
and defense-industrial organizations for Soviet developments. Russia’s cur-
rent science establishment still struggles to overcome this legacy of extreme
centralization.
During the final years of the Soviet Union some officials grew concerned
that excessive secrecy imposed an economic drag that negatively affected
military power. Exaggerated secrecy complicated domestic enterprises’ ac-
cess to information on new technologies and limited the chances for com-
mercializing such technologies abroad. The GDR’s smaller economy reduced
the impact of secrecy on domestic information flows, but concerns remained
about technology leakage to capitalist countries.
Soviet patent secrecy policies became more relaxed when Mikhail Gor-
bachev became General Secretary. In 1986 many applications that would
have been filed at the Ministry of Defense’s patent department were now
filed in the secret department (Spetstekhniki) of the civilian State Commit-
tee for Inventions and Discoveries and more of them were published. Finally,
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in 1991 patent secrecy took a radical turn when the new Soviet patent law
abolished inventor’s certificates and the Ministry of Defense’s separate se-
cret examination system. The Russian Federation government created no
national procedures for handling secret inventions until 2004; in the mean-
time, secret Russian patent applications piled up in a Rospatent safe.
The end of secret patents in the GDR proved less dramatic; after the
GDR’s collapse many of its secret patent holdings were destroyed and the
remaining documentation was transferred from AfEP’s HA I to Büro 99 of
the German Patent and Trademark Office (DPMA) in Munich. Most of the
transferred files were subsequently declassified.
6 Appendix - Estimating the Number of Secret GDR
Patents
The DPMA provided us with a list of the application numbers for 930 pre-
viously secret inventions (Deutsches Patent und Markenamt, Geschäftsstelle
99). To estimate the total number of secret patents granted from mid-1963
to 1990, we examined if the DPMA list of 930 was comprehensive.
If the DPMA list contains all secret GDR patents, then secret inventions
would have comprised about 0.6 percent of total GDR non-secret inven-
tions,49 a considerably smaller share than that recorded for secret inventions
in the Soviet Union and not out of line with patent secrecy in developed
market economies.
We established that the DPMA list is not comprehensive. First, it ex-
cluded secret patents that had been declassified prior to 1990. Second, a
random sample showed that the list doesn’t include some pre-1990 patents
with unusual delayed publications, something akin to secrecy. Third, we
noted that some GDR enterprises were underrepresented. Finally, a closer
look at Carl Zeiss Jena’s U-Betrieb, a largely defense-oriented part of the
firm, indicated that a large number of its patents have never been published.
49We are unable to explain why the DPMA’s list of 930 differs from Breith’s 950. The
estimate for total non-secret GDR applications combines the WIPO data for the number
of GDR patent applications from 1965 to 1969 (24,419), adjusted to exclude applications
by foreigners, and AfEP data for domestic GDR non-secret applications from 1970 to 1989
(139,532) from figure 1. The year 1965 is chosen to account for the fact that secrecy didn’t




Secret patents declassified prior to 1990 are not in the DPMA list, which con-
tains only those patents that were still secret in 1990. Excluding declassified
patents biases the estimate downwards, i.e., understates the total number of
secret GDR patents.
What share of total GDR patents is accounted for by declassified patents?
Did the GDR, much like the Soviet Union, declassify only a few of its secret
inventions? In Carl Zeiss Jena’s official Patentregister 22 secret patents
were identified, a relatively small share of the firm’s total patents, and 10
of them had publication dates, indicating that they had been declassified.
For the published secret patents, the average time between application and
publication was 11.1 years, a much longer time than the average for non-
secret inventions (Betriebsarchiv: Patentregister). If one assumes the Carl
Zeiss Jena firm’s share of secret patents and its rate of declassification as a
norm for other enterprises, then secret patents may actually comprise about
1.2 percent of total GDR patents.
6.2 Random Sample
We constructed a random sample from EPO Data to examine the possi-
ble impact of delayed publications on our estimate of the total number of
secret GDR patents. The Espacenet patent search website provides access
to bibliographic information for the first publication level of 221,950 GDR
patents, from patent DD1 (application date 1951-06-04) to patent DD302035
(application date 1987-04-22).50
Using our random sample of GDR patents from the EPO database, we
calculated the length of time between the application and publication dates
for each of the patents in the sample.51 After excluding 77 foreign appli-
cations, we were left with a sample of 148 inventions. The time between
application and publication for the applications with no examination aver-
50The European Patent Officean in an email correspondence was unable to explain why
information was not available for many of the publication numbers. The DPMA notes
that publication numbers 161274 to 200000 were not used. Taking that information into
account and assuming that each unique publication number represents a single invention,
one would expect there to be information on 263,309 (302,035 minus 38,726) patents, not
221,950.
51We used Libre Office Calc to pick 225 random numbers between 77017 (Sept 1969) and
140160 (Oct 1978). Surprisingly our random sample contained 77 foreign applications, a
much higher share than would have been found among Soviet applications. Germany
accounted for 27 of the foreign applications; other CMEA, for only 13. The foreign
applications were excluded from the analysis.
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aged 1.3 years; for those with examinations, 4.2 years. For two inventions
the time between application and publication was more than ten years. This
time period resembled what one might reasonably expect for secret inven-
tions, i.e., about 1.4 percent of the randomly sampled inventions might have
been secret, either declassified or with a delayed publication, a share that
closely resembles our Carl Zeiss Jena result.
The small share of total GDR patents accounted for by delayed publi-
cations contrasts strikingly with Soviet practices. Soviet delayed publica-
tions expanded continuously and by 1989 they represented about 34 percent
of all grants made by the State Committee for Inventions and Discoveries
(Martens, table A5.3).
6.3 Underrepresented Enterprises
As noted above, DPMA officials did not find HA I’s official register, which
would have provided an comprehensive accounting of all secret patents,
among the files remaining after the GDR’s implosion. We examined more
closely the 930 secret inventions to ascertain if they included most of the
GDR’s important technology-intensive enterprises that one might expect to
have secret patents. If facilities seem to be missing or underrepresented, then
the 1.2 percent estimate would need further adjusting.
In fact some of the GDR’s defense-industrial enterprises appear to be
underrepresented in the DPMA list. The Kombinat Spezialtechnik from
Dresden-Klotzsche, for example, was almost entirely focused on military
technology (Weckbrodt), 52 which probably accounts for the fact that it’s
not included in the list of enterprises listed in AfEP’s confidential patent
survey. One would expect to see Kombinat Spezialtechnik inventions well
represented among the 930 secret patents, but that’s not the case. Only 9
of the 930 secret patents list Kombinat Spezialtechnik as an applicant.
TheVEB Chemieanlagenbau Kombinat Leipzig-Grimma was another lead-
ing GDR technology-intensive enterprise. This enterprise also had secret sec-
tions which had many secret patents, most likely for commercial rather than
national defense reasons. One such secret research group had 13 previously
secret patents published after 1989, but none were in the DPMA list.53 Only
one invention from the VEB Chemieanlagenbau appeared in the DPMA list.
Consequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that the missing HA I Paten-
tregister contained far more secret inventions than were later listed by the
52Spezialtechnik was a common Soviet euphemism for military technology.
53We learned of them only through one of the inventors. Email communication with
one of the inventors Nov. 11, 2016.
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DPMA.
6.4 Carl Zeiss Jena U-Betrieb
A closer look at the Carl Zeiss Jena Patentregister provided further insights
into the DPMA list’s lack of comprehensiveness. Carl Zeiss Jena was one of
the GDR’s leading enterprises, focusing its research on technologies related
to optics, specialty glass, scientific instrumentation, lasers and semiconduc-
tors. According to AfEP data, Carl Zeiss Jena consistently ranked among
the most active filers of non-secret patents.54 The enterprise’s official Paten-
tregister, a log of all patent applications and their disposition, recorded 4,524
GDR applications for the 1963-1990 period.
In the early 1980s Soviet officials pressured GDR officials to devote more
resources to military technologies. At this time Carl Zeiss Jena established
its U-Betrieb, which focused on military technologies such as those used in
laser guidance systems. The Carl Zeiss Jena Patentregister only published
ranges of register numbers for U-Betrieb patents, no details, a practice that
mirrored how Soviet defense-industrial facilities accounted for secret inven-
tions. It recorded 687 U-Betrieb patents.
Given the general secrecy that surrounded the U-Betrieb, one can rea-
sonably assume that many U-Betrieb patents were secret – but what share of
them? Even in the Soviet Union many defense industrial facilities published
non-secret inventions, albeit usually minus the facility name.
The DPMA list of 930 secret patents contained only 46 Carl Zeiss Jena
or Jenoptik inventions. An analysis of the Carl Zeiss Jena Patentregister
also revealed that most information on U-Betrieb secret patents remained
unpublished.55
We conclude that most of the 687 U-Betrieb patents remain unaccounted
for in either the on-line information or in the DPMA list of 930 secret patents,
and therefore we further conclude that the destroyed HA-I register contained
information on many more secret GDR patents than the 930 included in the
DPMA list. If all U-Betrieb patent applications were secret, then the share
of secret inventions for Carl Zeiss Jena would be about 13.5 percent, a share
closer to, but still considerably lower than, Soviet practices. The 13.5 percent
54AfEP data excluded secret patents from its data, paralleling Soviet practices.
55The Carl Zeiss Jena Register lists all non-U Betrieb inventions with their publication
numbers. By searching the publication numbers in online databases, one can determine
the original application number for each of these inventions. Subsequently one can search
those post-reunification patents with Carl Zeiss Jena or Jenoptik as assignee that have no
application number listed in the Patentregister, which would likely be U-Betrieb inventions.
We found only 17 such patents out of the 97 patents published in 1990 or afterwards.
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share, while convenient to use as a maximum upper boundary, certainly
overstates for the share for the economy as a whole. Carl Zeiss Jena was
a prominent technology intensive firm and not typical of many other GDR
industrial firms that were oriented toward civilian economic sectors such as
food processing and agriculture.
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